ABSTRACT Elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) has the merits of providing shorter key length and higher processing speed compared with other public key cryptosystems with respect to the same security level. In addition, blind signcryption is widely used for privacy-preserving applications, such as electronic cash, electronic voting, electronic auction and electric contract. In this work, we construct certificateless blind signcryption with low complexity (LC-CLBS) by combining elliptic curve blind signcryption with certificateless public key cryptosystem. Its security is based on the intractability of the discrete logarithm and computational Diffie-Hellman problems in elliptic curve. Analysis demonstrates that LC-CLBS scheme enjoys high computational efficiency and low communication overheads. LC-CLBS scheme is especially suitable to be implemented in resource-restrained devices, e.g. it is appropriate for various applications in the ubiquitous mobile computing environments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information and communication technologies have made people's daily life much more convenient. In particular, the development of Internet allows data to be exchanged more effectively and it provides the necessary facilities for various applications such as electric contract, electronic voting, electronic payment or electronic auction. In 1982, Chaum [1] proposed the first blind signature scheme which hides the contents for sensitive data and protects the privacy for digital information. Blind signature allows a message owner to blind the message to be signed and reshape the outlook of the signature, so that the signer cannot link the signature with the original message. Obviously, the signed message is transmitted between a message owner and a signer, and the message contents are unknown to the signer. It is a very useful building block in applications in which the anonymity is one of the most significant considerations. Since 1982, increasing attention has been paid to blind signature [2] - [7] because it offers a convenient solution to secure communication. Later, the researchers devised blind signcryption schemes [8] - [10] The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving it for publication was Sabu M. Thampi.
by combining the functionality of blind signature and encryption. Blind signcryption can simultaneously realize blind signature and encryption in a logic step with lower computation and communication costs, compared with the conventional methods. In other words, it is more computationally efficient than a direct composition of encryption and blind signature.
Elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) was introduced by Koblitz [11] in 1987. Cryptosystems based on ECC can provide higher security level with smaller key size. For instance, an elliptic curve key defined on an additive group with 256-bit length is considered to be as secure as an RSA key with 3072-bit length [12] . ECC is particularly useful in the environments where storage space, power consumption, bandwidth or processing power is constrained. In 2014, Ullah et al. [13] proposed blind signcryption scheme based elliptic curve. In 2017, Su and Tsai proposed ECC-based blind signcryption scheme for multiple digital documents [14] and new proxy blind signcryption scheme based on ECC for secure multiple digital message transmission [15] . In 2018, paring-free identity-based blind signature scheme with message recovery [16] was proposed. Later, Zia and Ali improved a signcryption scheme based on elliptic curve for firewalls [17] in 2018 and described the VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ improvement of a blind signcryption scheme based on elliptic curve [18] in 2019. However, no blind signcryption scheme is based on certificateless public key cryptosystem (CL-PKC) [19] - [23] . CL-PKC not only avoids the use of certificate in traditional public key cryptosystem (TPKC), but also it surmounts the problem of key escrow in identity-based public key cryptosystem (IB-PKC). In CL-PKC, an entity's private key includes a secret value chosen by this entity and a partial private key generated by a trusted key generation center (KGC). Up to now, most of existing certificateless blind signcryption schemes are from bilinear pairings. Generally speaking, the computational costs of one pairing operation are higher than those of ECC scalar multiplication. For example, NanoECC, which uses the MIRACL library, takes around 17.93s to compute one pairing operation and around 1.27s to compute one ECC scalar multiplication on the MICA2 (8MHz) mote [24] . Therefore, it is an important and interesting problem to study how to devise an efficient and secure certificateless blind signcryption scheme based on the discrete logarithm and computational Diffie-Hellman problems in elliptic curve.
A. CONTRIBUTIONS
In this work, we construct a certificateless blind signcryption with low complexity (LC-CLBS) which has the merits of ECC, CL-PKC and blind signcryption. LC-CLBS scheme allows a message owner to blind a message to be signed and reshape the outlook of this signature, so that the blind signcrypter cannot link the signature with original message. In the random oracle model, LC-CLBS scheme has the existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks (UF-CMA) and indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2). LC-CLBS scheme is more attractive for applications in the resource-restrained environments. Comparison analysis illustrates that LC-CLBS scheme achieves better performance. In the future work, we are going to refer to the literatures [25] , [26] to construct secure blind signcryption from CL-PKC and ECC suitable for multi-server-based e-healthcare which can resist man-at-theend and man-at-the-middle attacks.
B. PAPER ORGANIZATION
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we first describe the meaning of notations appeared in this paper and then review ECC together with several hard problems on which the security of LC-CLBS scheme relies on. At the same time, we also describe the key comparison of ECC and RSA/DSA. In Section 3, we illustrate the working process and algorithm framework of LC-CLBS scheme together with its security models. In Section 4, we introduce a concrete LC-CLBS scheme. In Section 5, we provide the detailed security proof of LC-CLBS scheme. In section 6, we compare LC-CLBS scheme with previous schemes in terms of computational efficiency and security. Finally, the conclusions of this paper are drawn in Section 7.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. NOTATIONS
Readers can know the meaning of notations appeared in this paper in Table 1 . 
B. ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY
Let F denote the finite field of modulo of a large prime p. A non-singular elliptic curve E over finite field F is defined via the equation:
where a and b are non-negative integers which are smaller than the prime number p and satisfy 4a 3 + 27b 2 mod p = 0. Keep in mind that O is a point at infinity of elliptic curve E, G is the base point of elliptic curve E over finite field F, and n is the prime order of point G satisfying nG = O. The points of elliptic curve E(a, b) together with a point O at infinity form an cyclic addition group G p with order p. That is,
A point S = (x, y) is an elliptic curve point if it satisfies the equation (1) , and the point U = (x, −y) is called the negative of S, i.e., S = −U. Let H = (x 1 , y 1 ) and I = (x 2 , y 2 ) denote two different elliptic curve points which satisfy the equation (1) . Addition of two points in elliptic curve E is defined as a line between two points and the intersection of the line in elliptic curve E. The negative of the intersection point is used as the result of the addition. The operation is denoted by H + I = R or
Then (x 3 , y 3 ) in (2) can be calculated by the following equation (3):
where λ =
. Point doubling in elliptic curve is defined as a tangent of the point and the intersection of line in the elliptic curve. The negative of the intersection point is used as the result of the addition.
where λ = 
2) ECCDH PROBLEM Definition 2 (ECCDH Problem): Given two points H and X of elliptic curve E, where H = aG (a < n) and X = bG (b < n), the elliptic curve computation Diffie-Hellman (ECCDH) problem is that it is computationally infeasible to find out another point Y = abG. Any PPT algorithm A has negligible advantage Adv ECCDH A (k) in solving the ECCDH problem, where Adv ECCDH A (k) is defined to be: Table 2 shows the key comparison of RSA/DSA and ECC [12] , [27] .
III. FORMAL DEFINITION of CLBS SCHEME A. ALGORITHM MODEL
A LC-CLBS scheme consists of five PPT algorithms: Setup, Extract, KeyGen, BlindS and Unsigncrypt. The working process of LC-CLBS is shown in Figure 1 . Each algorithm of LC-CLBS scheme is described as follows.
Setup is an initialization algorithm run by the KGC which takes a security parameter k as input and outputs a system master key x together with a set of public system parameters γ .
Extract is an extraction algorithm run by one user which takes γ and the identity I i of this user as input and outputs the private key X i of this user together with public key Y i of this user.
KeyGen is a key generation algorithm run by the KGC which takes γ and the public key Y i of one user as input and outputs the partial public key U i of this user together with partial private key S i of this user.
BlindS is a blind signcryption algorithm which takes
as input and outputs a ciphertext σ to the receiver. VOLUME 7, 2019 Unsigcrypt is an unsigncryption algorithm which takes
as input and outputs a message m if the verification equality holds and an error symbol ⊥ otherwise.
B. SECURITY MODELS
A LC-CLBS scheme must satisfy the confidentiality (IND-CCA2 security) and unforgeability (UF-CMA security). In the security models, the queries by blind signcryter and receiver with the same identity are not allowed. LC-CLBS scheme can resist the attacks of type I adversary A I and type II adversary A II . A I is a common system user who can replace any user's public key in an adaptive way, but it does not possess the master private key of KGC. Whereas, A II can access the system master key of KGC, but it cannot replace any user's public key.
1) CONFIDENTIALITY
The IND-CCA2 security model for the confidentiality of LC-CLBS is shown in Figure 2 . We now show the IND-CCA2-I security model in terms of an interaction game IND-LC-CLBS-CCA2-I played between a type I adversary A I and a challenger .
IND-LC-CLBS-CCA2-I:
First of all, obtains a set of public system parameters γ together with a master key s by calling Setup(1 k ). Finally, keeps the secrecy of x, but it delivers γ to A I .
Phase 1: A I adaptively issues a polynomially bounded number of queries.
Request Public Key:
A I selects an identity I i and requests a full public key for this identity. returns its full public key
Private Key Queries: A I selects an identity I i and queries a private key for this identity. returns its private key X i if its public key has not been replaced before this query.
Partial Private Key Queries: A I selects an identity I i and queries a partial private key for this identity. returns its partial private key S i .
Replace Public Key: A I uses Y i , U i of its choice in appropriate range to replace the full public key of identity I i .
Blind Signcryption Queries: A I submits a query of blind signcryption for the message m, the identity I a of blind signcryter and the identity I b of receiver. returns a ciphertext σ by a call to blind signcryption algorithm.
Unsigncryption Queries: A I submits an unsigncryption query for the ciphertext σ , the blind signcryter's identity I a and the receiver's identity I b . returns m or ⊥ by a call to unsigncryption algorithm.
Challenge: At the end of the first phase, A I selects a pair of equal-length messages m 0 and m 1 together with the blind signcryter's identity I * a and the receiver's identity I * b on which it wishes to be challenged. In the first phase, A I cannot submit a full private key query for identity I * b . selects a random θ from {0,1} and calculates a challenge ciphertext σ * of message m θ . Finally, returns σ * as challenge ciphertext.
Phase 2: A I continues to issue a polynomially bounded number of queries again in an adaptive way as in the first phase.
deals with these queries as in the first phase. In the second phase, A I cannot submit a query for identity I * b to the full private key oracle and should not submit a query on σ * to unsigncryption oracle.
Finally, A I terminates the game IND-LC-CLBS-CCA2-I by outputting a guess θ . A I wins the game IND-LC-CLBS-CCA2-I if θ = θ . We define the advantage of this adversary as follows:
Let us describe the IND-CCA2-II security model in terms of an interactive game IND-LC-CLBS-CCA2-II played between a type II adversary A II and a challenger .
IND-LC-CLBS-CCA2-II:
First of all, obtains a system master private key x together with a set of system parameters γ by a call to Setup(1 k ). Finally, returns both x and γ to A II .
Phase 1: A II adaptively issues a polynomially bounded number queries to .
Request Public Key: A II queries a full public key for the identity I i of its choice. delivers its full public key (Y i , U i ) to the adversary.
Full Private Key Queries: A II submits a full private key query for the identity I i of its choice. delivers its full private key (X i , S i ) to the adversary.
Blind Signcryption Queries: A II submits a query of blind signcryption for (m, I a , I b ).
runs the blind signcryption algorithm and returns a ciphertext σ as answer.
Unsigncryption Queries: A II submits an unsigncryption query for (σ, I a , I b ). runs the unsigncryption algorithm and returns m or ⊥ as answer.
Challenge: At the end of the first phase, A II outputs a pair of messages m 0 , m 1 ∈ {0, 1} together with a pair of identities I * a (the identity of blind signcrypter) and I * b (the identity of receiver) on which it wishes to be challenged. In the first phase, this adversary cannot submit a query for identity I * b to the private key oracle. chooses a random θ from {0,1} and computes a ciphertext σ * of message m θ . Finally, outputs the challenge ciphertext σ * to the adversary.
Phase 2: A II continues to issue a polynomially bounded number of queries again in an adaptive fashion as in the first phase. Moreover, the challenger deals with these queries as in the first phase. In the second phase, this adversary cannot query the private key of identity I * b and should not submit a query on σ * to the unsigncryption oracle.
Finally, A II terminates the game IND-LC-CLBS-CCA2-II by outputting a guess θ and wins the game IND-LC-CLBS-CCA2-II if θ = θ. The advantage of this adversary is defined as:
Definition 4 (Confidentiality): A LC-CLBS scheme is said to be IND-CCA2-I secure if no PPT adversary A I wins IND-LC-CLBS-CCA2-I with non-negligible advantage. In like manner, a LC-CLBS scheme is said to be IND-CCA2-II secure if no PPT adversary A II wins IND-LC-CLBS-CCA2-II with non-negligible advantage. Thus, a LC-CLBS scheme is said to be IND-CCA2 secure if it is both IND-CCA2-I and IND-CCA2-II secure.
2) UNFORGEABILITY
The UF-CMA security model for the unforgeability of LC-CLBS is shown in Figure 3 . We now illustrate the UF-CMA-I security model in terms of an interaction game UF-LC-CLBS-CMA-I performed between a challenger and a type I adversary A I .
UF-LC-CLBS-CMA-I:
First of all, runs Setup(1 k ) to obtain a set of system parameters γ together with a master private key x. Finally, keeps the secrecy of x, but it outputs γ to A I .
Train: A I issues a sequence of queries in an adaptive way just like Phase 1 in IND-LC-CLBS-CCA2-I. deals with these queries as in Phase 1 in IND-LC-CLBS-CCA2-I.
Forgery: At the end of the queries, A I outputs a forgery ciphertext σ * on a pair of identities I * a , I * b . In queries, A I cannot query the private key and partial private key of identity I * a and σ * should not be the response for any signcryption query made by A I .
If the result of unsigncryption is valid, A I wins UF-LC-CLBS-CMA-I. We define the advantage of A I as the probability that it wins UF-LC-CLBS-CMA-I.
Let us show the UF-CMA-II security model in terms of an interactive game UF-LC-CLBS-CMA-II played between a challenger and a type II adversary A II .
UF-LC-CLBS-CMA-II:
First of all, calls Setup(1 k ) to obtain a master key s and a set of system parameters γ . Then delivers γ and x to A II .
Train: A II issues a sequence of queries in an adaptive way as Phase 1 in IND-LC-CLBS-CCA2-II. deals with these queries as in Phase 1 in IND-LC-CLBS-CCA2-II.
Forgery: At the end of the queries, A II outputs a forgery I * a , I * b , σ * . In queries, this adversary cannot query the private of identity I * a and σ * should not be the response for any signcryption query made by this adversary.
If the result of unsigncryption is not the symbol ⊥, A II wins UF-LC-CLBS-CMA-II. The advantage of A II is defined as the probability which it wins UF-LC-CLBS-CMA-II.
Definition 5 (Unforgeability): A LC-CLBS scheme is said to have the UF-CMA-I security if no PPT adversary A I wins UF-LC-CLBS-CMA-I with non-negligible advantage. In the same way, a LC-CLBS scheme is said to have the UF-CMA-II security if no PPT adversary A II wins UF-LC-CLBS-CMA-II with non-negligible advantage. Thus, a LC-CLBS scheme is said to be UF-CMA secure if it has both the UF-CMA-I and UF-CMA-II security. Algorithm 1 Setup Input: A system security parameter k. Output: A master key x and a set of system parameters γ .
IV. AN EXAMPLE OF CLBS SCHEME
Step 1 The KGC chooses a large prime p and an elliptic curve E defined over finite field F, and it chooses a base pointG of elliptic curve E with prime order n, where G is also a generator of cyclic addition group G p with prime order p [19] .
Step 2 The KGC chooses a random x from Z * n as the master key and calculate y = xG as the system public key.
Step 3 The KGC chooses cryptography hash functions: h 1 :
where t is the length of arbitrary identity and is the symmetric key length.
Step 4 The KGC keeps the secrecy of x, but it publishes a set of system parameters γ = (
Algorithm 2 Extract
Input: γ and the identity I i (i = a, b) of one user. Output: The public key X i and private key Y i of this user with identity I i .
Step 1 The user with identity I i selects a random X i ∈ [1, n) as the private key and calculates Y i = X i G as the public key.
Algorithm 3 KeyGen
Input: γ , the master key x and one user's identity I i (i = a, b). Output: The partial public key U i and partial private key S i of this user with identity I i .
Step 1 The KGC makes use of a random υ i ∈ [1, n) of its choice to calculate the partial public key U i = υ i G and partial private key
Step 2 The KGC calculates R i = S i G + υ i Y i and delivers (S i , R i , U i ) to this user with identity I i who can verify the legitimacy of the partial private key S i and check the validity of the partial public key U i by using the values at both sides of the verification equalities
It is easy to verify the correctness of LC-CLBS scheme by calculating the values at both sides of the equality (10) . Step 1 Alice calculates β = fG by using a random f ∈ [1, n) of its choice and delivers β to M.
Step 2 M calculates r = ωβ and µ = ω·h 2 (m, r) by using a random ω ∈ [1, n) of its choice and sends µ to Alice. Step 1 The receiver calculates
Step 3 Alice calculates
Step 2 If sG = h 2 (m, r)
+ r holds, the receiver accepts the message m and outputs a symbol ⊥ otherwise. advantage ε by making l i (i =1,2,3) queries to the h i oracle, l p queries to the private key oracle, l p queries to the partial private key oracle and l r queries to the public key replacement oracle, there exists an algorithm that can use A I to solve the ECCDH problem with an advantage
where e is the base of natural logarithm Proof: Assume receives a random instance (G, aG, bG) of the ECCDH problem and its aim is to determine the value of abG, where a and b are unknown to . For this aim, runs A I as a subroutine and plays the role of the challenger of A I in the interactive game. Assume A I first queries the h 1 oracle with identity I i before it queries any other oracle with identity I i as input.
First of all, generates the system parameters γ with y = aG by running Setup(1 k ). Finally, this challenger returns γ to A I . Request Public Key: first selects an integer τ from {1, 2, . . . , l 1 } and fixes I τ as the target identity for challenge phase, where τ and I τ are unknown to A I . Let δ be the probability of I i = I τ , δ will be determined later. A I queries a public key for identity I i of its choice. It is necessary for to consider the following two cases in response to this query: 
Private Key Queries: A I queries a private key for identity I i , fails and terminates this query if I i = I τ ; otherwise, it returns the private key X i from the list L k .
Partial Private Key Queries: A I submits a partial private key query for identity I i of its choice. fails and terminates this query if I i = I τ ; otherwise, obtains υ i by calling public key oracle and sets S i = υ i as the partial private key, then calculates R i = S i G+υ i Y i . Finally, updates the list id A with (I i , X i , υ i , S i , U i , Y i ) and returns (S i , R i ) as answer. A I can verify the validity of the partial public key U i and partial private key S i by using two equalities (12) and (13): 
Blind Signcryption Queries: A I submits a query of blind signcryption on the message m, the blind signcrypter's identity I a and the receiver's identity I b . returns a ciphertext σ by a call to actual signcryption algorithm if I a = I τ ; otherwise, uses two randoms f , ω ∈ [1, n) of its choice to calculate (β, r, N ) by the equalities (14)∼(16):
It adds (m, r, N ) into the list L 2 and continues to calculate (µ, V , W , J , H , c) by the equalities (17)∼(22):
It then adds (J , r, H ) into the list L 3 and calculates s such that sG = ω (W + 1) β. Finally, it returns σ = (r, c, s) as a ciphertext.
It is easy for A I to verify the validity of σ by using the values at both sides of the verification equality (23) . (the receiver's identity) on which it wants to be challenged. In the first phase, this adversary cannot query the full private key of identity I * b . fails and terminates this query if I * b = I τ ; otherwise, deals with this challenge query in the following way: It randomly selects ω * ∈ [1, n) and calculates (β * , r * , N * , µ * ) by the equalities (28)∼(31):
and adds (m θ , r * , N * ) into the list L 2 . Then it chooses a random X ∈ [1, n) and continues to calculate (W * , J * ) by the equalities (32) and (33):
After that, it randomly chooses θ from {0,1} and calculates (H * , c * ) by the equalities (34) and (35):
and adds (J * , r * , H * ) into the list L 3 . Finally, it calculates s * such that s * G = ω * W * G + r * and returns σ * = (r * , c * , s * ) as challenge ciphertext.
Phase 2: A I submits another sequence of oracle queries in an adaptive way again as in the first phase. answers these queries in the same way as in the first phase. However, there are several restrictions in the second phase: (1) A I cannot query the full private key of identity I * b ; (2) A I cannot submit a query for σ * to the unsigncryption oracle.
Guess: In the light of the proof process, the adversary has the ability to break the IND-CCA2-I security of LC-CLBS scheme. Hence, the adversary should have queried the h 3 oracle with r * , S * b G, X * as input. If the adversary has made l 3 queries to the h 3 oracle, there must be l 3 tuples stored in the list L 3 and one X * from l 3 values in the list L 3 should be the solution for the ECCDH problem instance. selects one X * uniformly at random from l 3 values stored in the list L 3 and then outputs this value as the solution of ECCDH problem instance:
Analysis of Probability: In terms of the above game, the probability of not aborting the game in the first or second phase is δ l p +l p +l r . Then the probability of not aborting the game during the challenge phase is (1 − δ) . Thus, the probability that does not terminate the execution of game is δ l p +l p +l r (1 − δ). This value is maximized at
Referring to the probability analysis in [19] , we can obtain that the probability of not aborting the execution of the game is at least 1/e(l p + l p + l r ). For another, the probability of uniformly picking X * from the list L 3 is 1/l 3 , therefore, the probability C of in solving the ECCDH problem is at least ε
Theorem 2: If an IND-LC-CLBS-CCA2-II adversary A II can break the IND-CCA2-II security of LC-CLBS scheme with an advantage ε by making l i (i =1,2,3) queries to the h i oracle and l p queries to the full private key oracle, there exists an algorithm that can make use of A II to solve the ECCDH problem with an advantage ε ≥ ε/el 3 l p , where e is the base of natural logarithm Proof: Assume receives an ECCDH problem instance (G, aG, bG) and its purpose is to determine the value of abG.
For this purpose, acts as the role of the challenger of A II and runs this adversary as a subroutine in the whole game.
First of all, obtains the system parameters γ with y = xG by a call to initialization algorithm. Then it delivers γ and x to the adversary A II .
Phase 1: A II adaptively submits a polynomially bounded number queries. Here the h 1 ∼ h 3 oracle queries are identical to those of the first phase in Theorem 1. Other queries are described as follows.
Request Public Key: first selects a index τ from {1, 2, . . . , l 1 } and fixes I τ as the target identity for challenge phase. Let δ denote the probability of I i = I τ , δ will be determined later. A II requests a public key for identity I i of its choice. It is needful for to consider two cases in response to this query: Case 1: If this query is the τ th query, this challenger calculates U i = υ i G and sets Y i = aG, where v i is a random from [1, n) of its choice. Then it returns its full public key
Case 2: If this query is not the τ th query, this challenger calculates U i = υ i G and Y i = X i G, where v i andX i are two randoms from [1, n) of its choice. Then it then returns its full public key (U i , Y i ) and stores
Full private key queries: A II issues a full private key query for identity I i of its choice. considers two cases to deal with this query.
Case 1: If this query is the τ th query, this challenger fails and terminates this query.
Case 2: If this query is not the τ th query, this challenger calculates S i = υ i + λ i x mod n and R i = S i G + υ i Y i . Then it returns the full private key (S i , X i ) and updates the list L k
A II can readily verify the validity of the partial public key U i and partial private key S i by using two equalities (39) and (40):
Blind signcryption queries: A II submits a query of blind signcryption on the message m, the identity I a of blind signcrypter and the identity I b of receiver. It is necessary for to consider two cases in response to this query.
Case 1: If I a = I τ , this challenger returns a ciphertext σ by a call to actual signcryption algorithm.
Case 2: If I a = I τ , this challenger selects two randoms f , ω ∈ [1, n) and calculates (β, r, N , µ) by the equalities (41)∼(44):
and stores (m, r, N ) in the list L 2 . It then continues to calculate (V , W , J , H , c) by the equalities (45)∼(49):
and adds (J , r, H ) into the list L 3 . Finally, this challenger calculatess such that sG = ωW β and returns σ = (r, c, s) as a ciphertext.
A II can readily verify the validity of σ = (r, c, s) by the verification equality (51):
Unsigncryption queries: For each unsigncryption query on the ciphertext σ , the blind signcrypter's identity I a and the receiver's identity I b , considers two cases in response to this query. 
Finally, this challenger returns the message m if sG = N −1 · (U a + λ a y + Y a ) + r holds and outputs the symbol ⊥ otherwise.
Challenge: At the end of the first phase, A II selects a pair of messages (m 0 , m 1 ) ∈{0,1} l and a pair of identities (I * a , I * b ) on which it wants to be challenged. In the first phase, A II cannot query the full private key of identity I * b . needs to consider two cases in response to this query.
Case 1: If I * b = I τ , fails and terminates this query.
It then selects a random θ from {0, 1} and calculates (β * , r * , µ * ) by the equalities (55)∼(57):
It stores (m θ , r * , N * = h 2 (m θ , r * )) in the list L 2 and calculates (W * , J * , c * ) by the equalities (58)∼(60): 
Analysis of Probability: In terms of the interactive game, the probability that does not abort the game in Phase 1 or 2 is δ l p . Then the probability that does not abort the game in the challenge phase is (1 − δ) . Thus, the probability of not terminating the game is δ l p (1 − δ). This value is maximized at δ = 1 − 1 1 + l p . In terms of the probability analysis in [19] , the probability that does not abort the execution of the game is at least 1 el p . Since the probability that uniformly chooses Y * from the list L 3 is 1 l 3 , therefore, the probability C of in solving the ECCDH problem is at least ε el 3 l p .
B. UNFORGEABILITY
Theorem 3: If a UF-LC-CLBS-CMA-I adversary A I can break the sUF-CMA-I security of LC-CLBS scheme with an advantage ε (issuing l i queries to the h i (i = 1, 2, 3) oracle, l p partial private key queries, l p secret value queries and l r public key replacement), there exists an algorithm that can solve the ECDL problem with an advantage
where e is the base of natural logarithm Proof: Assume receives a random instance (G, aG) of ECDL problem and its aim is to determine the value of a. For this aim, runs the adversary A I as a subroutine and attempts to act as the role of the challenger of A I in the interactive game.
First of all, runs the initialization algorithm to achieve the system parameters γ with y = aG. Then this challenger returns γ as answer.
Train: A I adaptively issues a sequence of queries as those as in the first phase in Theorem 1. All answers to these queries are identical to those in the first phase in Theorem 1
Forgery: At the end of training phase, A I outputs a forgery σ * , I * a , I * b to the challenger. In the training phase, A I cannot query the full private key of identity I * a and σ * should not be the response for any signcryption queries by A I . fails and terminates the game if I * a = I τ ; otherwise, it makes use of the replay technique to generate another ciphertext σ * * = (r * , c * * , s * * ). obtains the solution of ECDL problem instance by using the forking lemma:
Then we can obtain the value of a by using the above two equalities.
Analysis of Probability: In accordance with probability analysis in Theorem 1, we can obtain that the probability of the challenger not aborting the execution of the game is at least 1/e(l p + l p + l r ). On the basis of above analysis, we can obtain the probability ε of the challenger in solving the ECDL problem is at least ε e l p + l p + l r .
Theorem 4: If a UF-CLBS-CMA-II A II can break the sUF-CMA-I security of CLBS with an advantage ε (making l i queries to the h i (i = 1, 2, 3) oracle and l p full private key queries), there exists an algorithm that can solve the ECDL problem with an advantage ε ≥ ε/el p , where e is the base of natural logarithm
Proof: Assume receives a random instance (G, aG) of ECDL problem and its aim is to determine the value of a. For this purpose, attempts to acts as the role of challenger of the adversary A II and runs this adversary as a subroutine in the whole game.
At the start of the game, obtains the system parameters γ with y = xG by a call to the initialization algorithm. Then it returns γ and x as answer.
Train: A II issues a sequence of queries in an adaptive way as those in the first phase in Theorem 2. All answers to these queries are identical to those of the first phase in Theorem 2.
Forgery: As the training phase is over, A II outputs a forgery σ * , I * a , I * b to the challenger. In the training phase, A II cannot query the private key of identity I * a and σ * should not be the response for any signcryption queries by A II . fails and terminates the game if I * a = I τ ; otherwise, this challenger use the replay technique to generate another valid ciphertext σ * * = (r * , c * * , s * * ). achieves the solution of ECDL problem instance by using the forking lemma:
Then we can determine the value of a by using the above two equalities.
Analysis of Probability: In accordance with probability analysis in Theorem 2, the probability of the challenger not terminating the game is at least 1/el p . On the basis of analysis, we can determine that the probability ε of the challenger in solving the ECDL problem is at least ε el p .
If the probability ε is not negligible, the challenger has the ability to solve the ECDL or ECCDH problem with nonnegligible probability ε . Since the challenger runs the adversary as a subroutine, this connotes the challenger can make use of the adversary to solve the ECDL or ECCDH problem with non-negligible probability ε . Obviously, it contradicts the initial ECDL or ECCDH assumption. Hence, the given assumption with respect to the ECDL or ECCDH problem, no adversary can succeed with probability ε which is not negligible.
VI. COMPARISON
In this section, we compare LC-CLBS scheme with existing schemes [9] , [10] in terms of computational cost and security in the blind signcryption and unsigncryption algorithms. In Table 3 and Figure 4 , H denotes the number of hash operations, Exp denotes the number of exponent operations, Pair denotes the number of bilinear pairing operations in multiplicative groups and Mul denotes the number of scalar multiplication operations in additive groups. In addition, '' √ '' denotes one scheme satisfies the relevant security property, Con denotes the confidentiality and Unf denotes the unforgeability. As shown in Table 3 , all schemes satisfy the IND-CCA and UF-CMA security. Let t H be the time cost of one hash operation. As shown in [27] , we can summarize and deduce the time cost of all operations as follows: Pair ≈ 1440t H , Exp ≈ 21t H and Mul ≈ 29t H . Hence, we can readily obtain the time cost of LC-CLBS is 208t H . Following comparison analysis, there are 5942t H in scheme [9] and 5976t H in scheme [10] . Obviously, LC-CLBS scheme has higher computation efficiency than existing schemes.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
A LC-CLBS scheme has many attractive features for communication networks in which anonymity needs to be considered. In the random oracle model, LC-CLBS scheme can resist adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks and adaptive chosen-message attacks. In LC-CLBS, a message owner allows a blind signcrypter to sign a blind message; but this blind signcrypter cannot obtain the contents of the message and is unable to link the signature with the message even if the message-signature pair was revealed to the public.
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